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Abstract
Economists have long recognized that lags in property reassessment benefit infre-
quent movers because it reduces their property taxes. But in addition reassessment
lags can influence the level of property taxes selected under majority rule. I show that
short delays in community-wide reassessment increase property tax collections because
it reduces the tax price for a majority of voters. However, longer delays reduce property
tax collections because the aggregate assessed base (and thus the tax yield) declines
so much. I formally characterize the cutoff between these regimes and show tax col-
lections are generally above their socially optimal level. This theory can help explain
why many people believe property taxes are excessive, and it also suggests that the
American system of taxing capital gains at realization, rather than on accrual, might
result in excessive rates. I test this theory on a sample of Pennsylvania municipalities
in the Philadelphia suburbs. This is a suitable crucible for such an evaluation because
community-wide reassessments are infrequently performed in Pennsylvania. It is not
possible to reject the theory’s basic predictions, and numerical estimates suggest that
a five year delay in community-wide reassessment increases government revenues by
six percent. However, reassessment delays do not impose statistically significant social
losses because they benefit infrequent movers.
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1 Introduction
Despite predictions of their imminent demise, property taxes remain a significant feature
of the American fiscal landscape. Between 1980 and 1994, property tax collections grew at
a 12.5% annual rate with per capita payments reaching $760 in 1994. Property taxes also
have the dubious distinction of remaining one of the most unpopular taxes in public opinion
polls (Dearborn [8]) and are typically perceived as being set at an excessive rate (ACIR [2]).
Many explanations for the tax’s limited appeal involve its method of administration. A
voter’s property tax is determined by the product of his property assessment and the tax
rate. At some regular frequency communities or states determine the assessed value of all
properties, usually pegged to some fraction of market value. In all other years, sold or newly
constructed homes are assigned assessed values which reflect their current market price while
unsold homes maintain their initial value. Since property values tend to appreciate, owners
of identical homes will face different tax burdens if they have moved at different times.
In this paper I evaluate how assessment practices shape voter demands for property taxes.
I consider a model where residents vote over property taxes which fund a public good. A
resident’s property assessment is determined by his tenure, defined as the more recent of
the time since his last move or the last community-wide reassessment. A community-wide
reassessment sets all property at a common market value and resets everyone’s tenure to zero.
Between reassessments unsold homes maintain their previous assessed value (and increase
in tenure) while sold and newly constructed homes are assessed at a higher, market value
which reflects the inflation rate (and their tenure is set to zero). This means that assessed
values, as well as property tax payments, are inversely proportional to home tenure.
I show that the tax revenue selected under majority rule is increasing in the ratio of the
aggregate tax base to the median tenured voter’s assessed value. Delays between community-
wide reassessments influence both of the terms in this ratio. First, a delay reduces the real
aggregate property tax base for the community: unsold homes maintain their original as-
sessed value but prices are increasing due to inflation. Second, a delay reduces the median
tenured voter’s real assessed value if he is a non-mover, since his nominal assessed value
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remains fixed. Short delays between community-wide reassessments result in higher tax rev-
enues, since the median’s real assessed value falls faster than the real aggregate assessed
base. This is because the median tenure surely increases (and thus the real median assess-
ment surely falls) while only a fraction of the total housing stock, the unsold property, has
a real reduction in assessed value. Long delays between reassessments lead to lower tax rev-
enues because the median tenure eventually becomes fixed while the real aggregate tax base
continues to shrink. I formally characterize the cutoff between the increasing and decreasing
tax regimes.
The model is consistent with observed features of property taxes and has implications
regarding capital gains taxation. First, the theory can help explain the common perception
that property taxes are excessive. In the typical case where a majority of voters have
not moved since the last reassessment, the tax rate selected is just optimal for the non-
movers but is too high for everyone else. This is because residents who have moved at least
once face a higher property assessment and thus a higher tax bill. Second, the theory is a
potential explanation for why property taxes tend to spike up in the year of a community-
wide reassessment. Previous authors who have documented this fact (Bloom and Ladd [4],
Ladd [16]) attribute it to voter fiscal illusion. However if the delay between community
reassessments is long enough, the majority-preferred tax level will fall below its initial level
due to the reduction in the aggregate assessed base. Fully rational voters should therefore
select higher taxes upon reassessment. Finally, the theory suggests that the American system
of taxing capital gains only at realization encourages higher tax rates. Individuals with
accrued gains (or with no capital assets) are like non-moving voters in the model: they face
a low tax price and so will prefer a relatively high tax rate. When more than half of the
voters are in this class, the capital gains rate selected under majority rule will be too high.
Shifting to a system which taxes on accrual is likely to alleviate this bias, an argument which
previous advocates of accrual taxation have failed to raise (see Auerbach [3]).
I evaluate the theory using a sample of Pennsylvania municipalities in the Philadelphia
suburbs. This is an excellent crucible for examining the role of community-wide reassess-
ments since Pennsylvania is perhaps the most lax state in enforcing its revaluation laws.
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With long lags between reassessments (typically exceeding 20 years), both periods of in-
creasing and decreasing property tax revenues should be observed. To test the model’s basic
predictions, I estimate a flexible, non-structural equation relating community-wide reassess-
ment delays to property tax revenues. It is not possible to reject the null that property taxes
reach a peak at the particular reassessment delay predicted by the theory. Then I make
a functional form assumption and estimate a structural equation relating community-wide
reassessment delays to total revenues. It is possible to uncover parameters of an underlying
utility function from these estimates and thus to perform social welfare calculations. I find
that a five year delay in community-wide reassessment increases government revenues by 6%,
and that even larger revenue increases result from delays up to fifteen years. However, the
social welfare loss from delaying community-wide reassessment is not statistically different
from zero. The reason the social loss is so small is that reassessment delays actually bene-
fit non-moving voters, and this utility gain largely counteracts the losses of recent movers.
Finally, the structural estimates are consistent with the observed timing of community-wide
reassessments in the sample. In total these results suggest that assessment practices strongly
influence property taxes and are further evidence of the important role institutions play in
determining policy outcomes.
No previous research has linked assessment practices to voter demands for property taxes.
Inman and Rubinfeld [14] note that preferential assessments can be used to bribe affluent
voters into not moving, but this practice seems limited to large cities. O’Sullivan, Sexton
and Sheffrin [18] evaluate how California’s acquisition value system, in which homes are
reassessed only when sold, influences property tax incidence and reduces mobility. Aaron [1]
shows that high tax rates result in more uniform assessment and hence a more equitable




Consider a community in which individuals own and occupy identical homes with the aggre-
gate housing stock initially normalized to unity. For simplicity assume that time is discrete
and that an exogenous proportion, λ > 0, of the housing stock is sold each year (the case
where sale probabilities vary across homes is discussed in Section 2.2). While homes never
depreciate or wear out, a fraction, θ > 0, of new homes are constructed each year. This
means the total housing stock increases by a factor (1 + θ) each year. Define the tenure
of a home, t, as the number of years since it was last sold or first constructed. Using the
convention that the initial period is Y = 0, a simple induction argument verifies that the
home tenure density in year Y is,
fY (t|λ, θ) ≡








Intuitively, higher λ and θ values result in a greater concentration of younger homes. Figure
1 plots the density for Y equal to 5, 25 and 100 years using representative property turnover
and construction rates. Notice that the density is downward sloping everywhere except for
the spike in the final year.
Initially each home is assessed at market value which is set equal to one. While property
values appreciate at a constant annual rate, π > 0, assessed values remain constant unless
a home is sold, constructed or there is a community-wide reassessment, any of which sets
the home assessment at full market value and its tenure to t = 0. For every year in which a
home is unsold and there is no community-wide reassessment, the home tenure increases by
one year and its real assessed value (the ratio of assessed to market value) falls by the level of
price increase, 1 + π. This means that a t-tenure home has a real assessed value of (1 + π)−t
which is decreasing in t (notice that freshly assessed, sold and constructed homes have a real
assessed value of 1). Each year the local government may levy a common property tax rate
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(“millage”), mY , on all homes. The real tax price for the owner of a t-tenure home equals
this rate times his assessed value,
pt(mY |π) = mY (1 + π)−t (2)
The real aggregate tax base per home for a community which last reassessed Y years ago is
AY (λ, θ, π) ≡
∑Y
t=0 fY (t|λ, θ)(1 + π)−t or,
AY (λ, θ, π) =
(λ + θ)(1 + π)
(1 + θ)(1 + π)− (1− λ)
+
π
(1 + θ)(1 + π)− (1− λ)
[
(1− λ)Y +1
(1 + θ)Y (1 + π)Y
]
(3)
and the real tax revenue per home is,
RY (mY |λ, θ, π) = mY AY (λ, θ, π) (4)
Because some homes are unsold each period, a delay between community-wide reassess-
ments reduces the real aggregate tax base (∂AY /∂Y < 0) though at a decelerating rate
(∂2AY /∂Y
2 > 0); even as Y approaches infinity, the real aggregate base remains positive.
To close the model I need to specify preferences, production possibilities and the method
of community decision. While taxes are costly, government revenues are devoted to a public
good which equally benefits all citizens. I will assume that the cost of government services
increases at the same rate as property values (π) and that there is congestion in provision
(the latter point is added for realism and is not central to any of the results which I prove).
Then a linear utility specification for the owner of a t-tenure home is,1
UY (t,mY |λ, θ, π) = B (RY (mY |λ, θ, π))− pt(mY |π) (5)
where B(.) maps real tax revenue per home into public good provision under the assumption
that B′ > 0 and B′′ < 0. Notice that the benefit (the first term) is constant for all citizens
while the tax price (the second term) varies based on home tenure.
The community uses majority rule to determine its tax rate. It is not difficult to show
1This form is equivalent to the more conventional utility function in which private consumption enters in
an additively separable fashion.
5
that citizens have single-peaked preferences over millage. Using (2), (4) and (5) the second





Y < 0, and the single-
peaked result follows so long as the first derivative ∂UY (t,mY )/∂mY is positive when revenue
is small.2 Due to Black’s Law the unique majority rule outcome is the median tenured home-
owner’s ideal millage, and this rate is characterized by his first order condition,
∂UY (tmedian, mY )
∂mY
= B′(RY )AY − (1 + π)−tmedian ≡ 0 (6)
where tmedian is the median tenure. Because B
′′ < 0 the optimal revenue, RY , is increasing
in the aggregate to median property assessment ratio, AY (1 + π)
tmedian . This ratio is the
marginal benefit to marginal cost of taxation for the median voter.
2.2 Results and Caveats
The first step is to identify the median tenured home in a community that last reassessed Y






fY (t|λ, θ) ≥ 0.5
}
(7)
There are two possible relationships between tmedian and Y . If there was a recent community-
wide reassessment then the median owner has not moved, tmedian = Y . A visual depiction of
this may be found in the first panel of Figure 1. Formally this case requires
∑Y−1
t=0 fY (t|λ, θ) <
0.5 or using (1), 1− [(1− λ)/(1 + θ)]Y < 0.5. This implies that Y is less than or equal to,
Y ∗(θ, λ) ≡ trunc
(
ln 2
ln(1 + θ)− ln(1− λ)
)
(8)
Evaluated at typical parameter values (e.g. Langhoff [17] Table 2.17, Figure 2.5), Y ∗(θ, λ)
tends to fall in the interval of 5 to 25 years. Notice that the threshold is smaller when owners
are more mobile (∂Y ∗/∂λ < 0) or homes are constructed more rapidly (∂Y ∗/∂θ < 0) but is
2A formal assumption which suffices for this point is limR→0 B′(R) = ∞.
3In the knife-edge case where exactly half of the homes have a tenure less than or equal to t, I call t
(rather than t + 1) the median. This is an innocuous convention.
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independent of the inflation rate (∂Y ∗/∂π = 0) which does not influence the tenure density.
The second case occurs when Y exceeds the threshold Y ∗ at which point the median is
fixed at Y ∗. To see this recall that when Y equals Y ∗, at least half of the homes have been
sold or constructed since the last community-wide reassessment. Because the top row of (1)
is independent of Y , the density of these young tenure homes will remain constant over time.
These two facts imply that the threshold Y ∗ must also be the median for any later year.
The median will therefore satisfy the relationship tmedian = min(Y, Y
∗).
I can now present the substantive results which relate delays in community-wide reassess-
ment to property taxes. Recall that in a non-reassessment year all unsold property increase
in tenure by one year (t → t + 1), sold and newly constructed property have their tenure
reset at zero (t = 0), and the reassessment variable increases by one year (Y → Y + 1); in
a reassessment year both the tenure of all property and the reassessment variable are set to
zero (t, Y = 0).
Proposition 1 In the years immediately following a community-wide reassessment, re-
assessment delays increase tax revenues. However, if the delay is long enough then collections
begin to fall. The threshold for the regime change occurs when the median age becomes fixed,
at delay Y = Y ∗(θ, λ).
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
The intuition follows from the two main dynamics here, the shrinking real aggregate tax
base and the shrinking real median assessment (recall from (6) that taxes are set by the
product of these terms). The first effect, noted following (3), encourages lower tax revenues
since a given millage raises less revenues when the aggregate base is small. The second
effect, however, induces higher tax revenues since the median’s tax price falls along with
his assessment. For short reassessment delays, the median effect dominates resulting in a
tax revenue increase. The reason is that the delay surely increases the median tenure by
one year (since tmedian = Y ) and thus surely reduces the real median assessment. But
only some of the overall housing stock increases in tenure (the proportion of unsold homes,
(1 − λ)/(1 + θ) < 1), and so the aggregate tax base shrinks more slowly than the median
assessment. For longer reassessment delays, however, the median tenure and thus the real
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median assessment becomes fixed (since tmedian = Y
∗), and so the shrinking real aggregate
assessed base results in a tax revenue decrease. The proposition is illustrated in Figure
2 which plots the optimal trajectory of tax revenues. The path seems insensitive to the
particular functional form of B(R) which is used.4 In contrast the millage dynamics are
quite sensitive to functional form assumptions, and so I will not focus on them here.5
It is also interesting to see whether property taxes are socially optimal (the role of non-
assessment distortions is discussed at the end of the section). Not surprisingly, in a non-
reassessment year property taxes are generally non-optimal. Under a utilitarian criterion,








B(mY AY )−mY (1 + π)−t
]
(9)
The socially optimal level of tax revenue, R∗Y ≡ m∗Y AY , is characterized by,
B′(R∗Y ) = 1 (10)
The left-hand side of this equation represents the marginal social benefit of raising taxes,
the increase in public services, while the right-hand side is the marginal social cost. Notice
that the socially optimal revenue is time invariant.
Now in the revaluation year all homes are assessed at true market value (one) and the
4It is possible to prove that the slope of the optimal revenue stream is insensitive to the choice of functional




∂ [AY (1 + π)tmedian ]
−1
/∂Y
B′′[B′−1((1 + π)−tmedianA−1Y )]
where B′−1 is the inverse of B′ and RY = B′−1((1+π)−tmedianA−1Y ). The functional form of B(
.) only enters
the right-hand side through the denominator, and all functions in the class B′ > 0, B′′ < 0 will impart
similar values.




AY ∂RY /∂Y −B′−1((1 + π)−tmedianA−1Y )∂AY /∂Y
A2Y
where B′−1 is the inverse of B′. The shape of the right-hand side is more sensitive to the choice of B(.)
than is ∂RY /∂Y because B(.) enters the second term in the numerator. Nonetheless, it is possible to show
that reassessment delays increase millage for Y ≤ Y ∗ and for all functional forms which I examined weakly
decrease millage for Y > Y ∗.
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size of the tax base is unity. This means the median’s first order condition (6) satisfies,
B′(R0) = 1 (11)
and so the socially optimal revenue is selected. The intuition is that a community-wide
reassessment both equalizes all tax prices and also sets all assessed values at their true
market value. This same result does not hold in other years since the first order condition
in (6) may be written as,
B′(RY ) = [AY (1 + π)
tmedian ]−1 (12)
I show in the proof of Proposition 1 that when Y ≤ Y ∗(θ, λ) the median is a non-mover, the
right-hand side of (12) is below one, and so tax collections are super-optimal (since B′′ < 0).
Reassessment delays beyond Y ∗(θ, λ) increase the right-hand side of (12) since the median
tenure is fixed and the aggregate assessed base is shrinking. It turns out that eventually tax
revenues become sub-optimal, so long as the parameters are sufficiently close to zero.6
Proposition 2 Property taxes generally differ from the social optimum in non-reassessment
years. Immediately following a revaluation collections are too high though with a long enough
wait (and presuming λ, θ, π are close to zero) the level becomes too low. The cutoff between
these regimes, which must occur in finite time, is the first delay Y > Y ∗(θ, λ) which meets,
AY (1 + π)
Y ∗(θ,λ) < 1 (13)
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Figure 2 illustrates this point: tax revenues eventually fall below their reassessment year
level, the social optimum.7
The final result characterizes the condition for majority rule approval of a community-
wide reassessment. Because this sets everyone’s property at full market value, it increases
6The parameter assumption is needed to justify Taylor expansions in the proof. When the parameters
approach one, tax revenues need not ever fall below their initial level (e.g. when λ = 0 and θ = 1 then the
top line of (23) is negative). In reality property turnover (λ), construction (θ) and inflation (π) rates tend
to be close to zero, so this is a reasonable assumption.
7The inefficiency result is related to majority rule’s inability to represent preference intensity. Individuals
face different tax prices based on how recently they have moved, but each gets a single vote. Initially the
non-movers determine the rate, so new residents’ intense opposition to high taxes goes unheeded. Eventually
taxes become sub-optimal since non-movers’ preference for high taxes is ignored.
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the aggregate tax base and hence the collections from any fixed tax rate (in addition, there is
a non-trivial cost associated with appraising each home’s value). Community-wide reassess-
ment is more costly for those who have not moved in many years, so if the median tenured
home-owner prefers a reassessment, then a strict majority will also.8 Recall that for short re-
assessment delays the median is a non-mover who has little desire for a new community-wide
reassessment. However, eventually the median tenure becomes fixed though the aggregate
tax base continues to shrink. This means the median is getting less services for any given
tax rate and suggests that if enough time elapses he will eventually prefer a reassessment.
Proposition 3 There can be majority support for a community-wide reassessment only when
there has been a long wait since the last one. If the physical cost of appraising property is low
and λ, θ, π are close to zero the minimum wait is finite, and when reassessment is costless it
is the smallest Y > Y ∗(θ, λ) which satisfies (13).
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
So when reassessment timing is endogenous, I can indirectly test the theory. In particular,
the model predicts the number of voters lobbying for a community-wide reassessment should
increase with the lag since the last one.
Before turning to the empirical results, it is important to discuss various assumptions
in the model. First, while the model assumes that all home-owners move with a common
probability in reality mobility is likely to be inversely related to tenure length. This reflects
the fact that long-time residents have a lower home assessment and thus a lower tax burden,
a benefit they give up if they move. I show in an extension, available upon request, when
property turnover decreases in tenure (∂λ/∂t < 0) that delays in community-wide reassess-
ment increase tax revenues almost everywhere for realistic parameter values (in contrast to
the constant turnover case, the median tenure continues to increase here). While it is not
possible to formally test whether property turnover varies with tenure length using the data
discussed in the next section,9 I will test whether the tax revenue implications of the varying
8Those who have moved or purchased more recently than the median see an even smaller increase in
assessed value and by definition this group has a mass of at least one half.
9There is one indirect piece of evidence consistent with a constant turnover rate and counter to a variable
rate: I cannot reject the null that community-wide reassessment lags have no effect on the mean community
rate of property turnover in the sample (regression omitted). If property turnover declined with tenure, then
there would be a significant negative relationship.
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turnover case hold.
Two other assumptions should be noted. While the model presumes all distortions work
through the assessment process, property taxes may distort the capital market or may be too
high because of politician agenda setting power (Romer and Rosenthal [22]). The omission
of these factors means the social welfare calculations should be interpreted cautiously.10 The
model also ignores capitalization of taxes. Infrequent reassessment places a large tax burden
on new home-owners and so drives down the equilibrium market value of all property.11 This
would lower the aggregate tax base but have only a limited affect on the median assessment,
reducing equilibrium property tax revenues. This suggests that the model overstates the
distortion due to reassessment delays.
3 Application: Property Taxes in Pennsylvania
3.1 Background and Sample
I will examine how property reassessment influences taxes in a sample of Pennsylvania com-
munities. There are three types of local governments in Pennsylvania: the largest, counties,
contain several municipalities and school districts which in turn are geographically cotermi-
nous. All three governmental forms levy property taxes with the selection of rates delegated
to elected politicians. In this paper I will focus only on municipalities since they collect more
property revenues than counties and are more numerous than school districts. In addition, as
the most visible and scrutinized local government12 municipalities are more likely to approx-
imate the direct democracy assumption at the center of the theoretical framework. In future
work it would be interesting to consider the interaction between these local governments.
10Still I will focus on social welfare differences and such relative calculations are unlikely to be greatly
altered by a constant, unmodeled distortion.
11There cannot be differential capitalization when property is identical. Because a prospective buyer values
all homes equally (since they will be assessed at full value upon purchase), homes of every tenure length will
have an identical market value.
12Public awareness of a local government is largely determined by the visibility of its spending responsibil-
ities. Counties administer a court and prison system whereas municipalities are responsible for higher profile
services such as police, fire protection and sanitation. School districts run primary and elementary schools.
A full discussion of Pennsylvania local governments may be found in Citizen’s Guide to Pennsylvania Local
Government [19].
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Property assessment is a county responsibility in Pennsylvania. During a non-
reassessment year parcels which are not sold maintain their prior assessed value13 while
sold properties (and all homes in a reassessment year) are pegged at some fraction of market
value;14 this fractional assessment does not change any of the predictions of the model so
long as practices are constant over time. While counties are legally obligated to reassess
all property each year, for various reasons Pennsylvania does not enforce this rule. Table 1
lists the most recent reassessments for the four counties in the Philadelphia suburbs: none
have revalued in the last fifteen years while one has not acted since the Depression.15 Not
surprisingly these delays significantly deteriorate the taxable property base: in 1960 the
mean assessed to market value ratio for these counties was 0.331 while in 1992 the ratio was
0.053. These counties are not isolated examples: the most recent survey of the International
Association of Assessing Officers [17] identifies Pennsylvania as the state which allows the
most time between reassessments.
Pennsylvania will be an ideal crucible for testing my theory. First, there should be enough
time between county reassessments to evidence or disprove the predicted tax dynamics. This
is because reassessment lags both less than and greater than the critical threshold Y ∗ will be
observed. Second, there will be sufficient heterogeneity to identify the key relationships. Not
only do the counties listed in Table 1 revalue property in different years, but each municipality
has a unique threshold, Y ∗, due to variation in property turnover and construction rates.
This means I will be able to distinguish between possible time trends in tax collections and
reassessment lag effects.
My sample will include annual observations from 1960 to 1992 of the 237 municipalities
which are contained in exactly one of the four suburban Philadelphia counties. The goal
will be to explain variation across these observational units in property tax revenues. The
central explanatory variables in the model are the rates of property turnover (λ), construction
13Homes improvements are differentially assessed with the original portion maintaining its initial value.
14While these facts are not formally codified, the chief assessing officers of several counties confirmed that
they represent accepted practices in Pennsylvania.
15These dates were obtained from each county’s chief assessing officer and cross-checked against State
Tax Equalization Board records whenever possible. Unfortunately, due to the extensive lags between the
reassessments there is some uncertainty with regard to the earlier years.
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(θ)16 and inflation (π). For the inflation rate I use the Philadelphia standard metropolitan
statistical area (SMSA) consumer price index (CPI) though the results are quite similar
when I substitute the Philadelphia SMSA house price index. The other two variables are
only available for a limited period at the end of the sample (the last 5 and 13 years for λ and
θ respectively), so I use the average value for each community; due to potential year-specific
anomalies in the raw data, I decided it was not warranted to use the annual values.
An advantage of using panel data is that I can control for demographic and fiscal char-
acteristics which may influence a community’s property taxes but were omitted from the
stylized model. These controls include median household income, total population, the pop-
ulation growth rate, the percentage of senior citizens, the home ownership rate, the number
of jobs, the percentage of land devoted to business and residential use, as well as indicators
for governmental form. A full discussion of these variables may be found in a related paper,
Strumpf [23]. Another explanatory variable I consider is an index based on government
overhead spending since I show in Strumpf [24] that overhead is correlated with expenditure
levels. Finally I control for non-property tax revenues. First, Pennsylvania municipalities
may levy an earned income tax (EIT) at a rate of one percent. I have shown elsewhere
(Strumpf [24]) that EIT collections can be treated as exogenous lump sums: a community
will levy only if neighboring communities already have the tax.17 Second, intergovernmen-
tal grants such as state highway aid can be an important and exogenous18 revenue source.
Descriptive statistics and sources for all variables may be found in Table 2.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
The main objective of the empirical estimates is to test the model in Section 2 and to
determine whether county reassessment delays have significant effects in practice. The model
16The construction rate is based on the number of housing units authorized by building permits. While
this potentially is a leading rather than current indicator, it is unlikely to be a significant problem since I
average values over an extended period.
17To control for differences in citizen tax burdens, I also include as explanatory variables the percentage
of workers who commute to Philadelphia, another state or pay the EIT at work.
18State highway aid, for example, is distributed based on a weighted average of population and local road
miles.
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predicts that short reassessment delays increase property tax revenues, longer delays decrease
property tax revenues and that the cutoff between these regimes occurs at a delay Y ∗ which
varies across communities. Also, according to (3), (6) and (8) the dynamic path of taxes
will depend on the values of π, λ and θ with the exact relationship depending upon the
functional form of the government production function. While it is not possible to consider
every possible alternative theory linking reassessment delays to tax revenues, several leading
hypotheses are listed in the first four rows of Table 3. The common feature of the first
three alternatives is that they assume reassessment lags have an identical influence in all
communities whether it is no effect (H1), a monotone effect (H2), or inducing a common
extremum (H3). The fourth alternative (H4) presumes that reassessment lags always increase
tax revenues though the rate of increase may vary across communities and time; this is the
prediction of the variable property turnover rate model mentioned at the end of Section 2.2.
The model proposed in this paper (H5: Varying Single Peak) is mutually incompatible with
these alternatives because it picks a distinct maximum for each community.
To help choose between the various hypotheses, I will estimate a reduced form equation
relating county reassessment delays to municipality property tax revenues. It would be
preferable not to impose any functional relationship in this estimation, but unfortunately
current semi- and non-parametric techniques rely on having continuous explanatory variables
while this problem is inherently discrete (since fiscal decisions are made once a year). Instead
I approximate the relationship between reassessment lags Y and property tax revenues RY






i + Xiν + ui (14)
The reassessment lags are interacted with a community-specific parameter ρin and the three
variables from the model, Zi ≡ πi|λi|θi;19 Xi is some additional set of covariates which are
independent of Y ;20 ρin, ωn and ν are parameters to be estimated and ui is a normally dis-
19The observed inflation rate is constant across communities but varies with time. So in any year t,
πi = πt ∀i.
20These additional variables are included to capture community-specific factors which are omitted from
the theoretical model. The assessed base AY is explicitly excluded from Xi because it trends with Y . Its
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tributed error term. This specification captures much of the model’s non-linearity through
the interaction terms and the community-specific parameters. The hypotheses in Table 3
are special cases of (14), and the parameter restrictions they impose are listed in the table’s
second column. Hypotheses H1–H3 impose a zero parameter on the interaction between
reassessment lags and community characteristics (ωn = 0) while Hypothesis H4 imposes an
inequality restriction on the parameters (ρin + Ziωn ≥ 0). My hypothesis H5 identifies a
unique polynomial peak for each community which can be computed from observed data.
This imposes a set of linear equality constraints (first order conditions) and inequality con-
straints (second order conditions) on the parameters.21 Hypothesis H5 also requires that any
other extrema fall outside of the observed sample for each community.22 I will refer to (14)
as the non-structural estimate because it is not directly connected to any underlying utility
function.
While the non-structural estimate provides a framework for evaluating the model, it
does not take full advantage of the theoretical restrictions. An alternative approach is to
estimate a structural equation which is derived from an utility function.23 Underlying the
structural estimates are four assumptions, none of which alter the theoretical predictions of
the model: (i) the functional form for the government production function is B(S) = αSγ
where S is total government revenue per home (see below), α > 0 is a scaling factor and
γ ∈ (0, 1) measures government efficiency (I also consider B(S) = −α exp(−γS) but omit
the results because of space constraints); (ii) allow community factors X to pre-multiply the
influence is captured in a reduced form manner by Zi.
21The first order condition requires that ∂RY (Y = Y ∗i )/∂Y = 0 or
∑
n n(ρin + Ziωn)(Y
∗
i )
n−1 = 0 ∀i. The
second order condition requires that ∂2RY (Y = Y ∗i )/∂Y
2 < 0 or
∑
n>0 n(n− 1)(ρin +Ziωn)(Y ∗i )n−2 < 0 ∀i.
22A polynomial which has non-sample extrema should more realistically fit the data. If there is only a
single maximum, a reassessment delay will have a larger effect on taxes the farther it is from the peak. The
theory rules out this possibility: because the assessed base asymptotes to a finite value (see (3)) so must the
tax revenues (take limits of (6) with tmedian = Y ∗). This means longer delays should actually have a smaller
influence on taxes. A polynomial which has a maximum within sample and a minimum beyond sample will
better match the theory: reassessment delays beyond the peak no longer have an accelerating effect on tax
revenues and the function need not be symmetric about the peak.
23The main difficulty with the structural approach is that it assumes a functional form for the government
production function B(.) which in turn imposes a particular relationship between property taxes and re-
assessment delays. The structural approach also assumes that the median age satisfies tmedian = min(Y, Y ∗)
where Y ∗ is calculated from the observed data using (8). This condition is important because the estimated
equation imposes that revenues are maximized when Y = Y ∗. Fortunately this assumption is tested in the
non-structural estimate and so is less problematic than the functional form assumption.
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j where β is some parameter; (iii) allow each
community to receive exogenous, non-property tax revenue G (see Section 3.1); (iv) allow
freshly assessed homes to be valued at a fraction c < 1 of true market value M , and for the
inflation rate to be time-varying, πs where s is time. Some algebra shows the majority rule
level of spending SY ≡ RY + G is,
ln(SY ) = κ0 + κ1 ln(A
obs
Y ) + κ2 ln(M) + κ3
tmedian∑
s=1
ln(1 + πs) +
∑
j
κ4j ln(Xj) + u (15)
where AobsY ≡ cMAY is the observed assessed base per home, tmedian ≡ min(Y, Y ∗) is calcu-
lated from the observed data using (8), κ1 = −κ2 = κ3 ≡ (1− γ)−1 > 1, and u is a normally
distributed error term. This is the structural equation which can be estimated using ordinary
least squares.24
The parameter estimates from (15), denoted with a “∧,” can be used used to calculate two






κ̂3 measures the relative spending distortion from a Y year county reassessment delay
because spending following a reassessment, S0, is socially optimal. Second, the social welfare
loss under a utilitarian criterion, WY ≡
Y∑
t=0





)X β̂α̂− (Ŝ0− ŜY ), where ŜY , γ̂, β̂ and α̂ are determined from (15).25 In addition
the estimates can be used to make inferences about the median voter’s utility function which
can then be used to indirectly evaluate Proposition 3, a theory of the timing of county-wide
reassessments.
24In the interest of improving fit, I will also allow for year- and community-specific constant terms. I
will also perform a rough test of the functional form assumption by including higher order versions of the
regressors; if these terms are significant, (15) is likely to be misspecified.
25In deriving (15) one can show γ̂ = 1− κ̂−1; α̂ = (cκ̂/(κ̂− 1)) exp(κ̂0/κ̂); β̂j = κ̂4j κ̂ for κ̂ = κ̂1, −κ̂2, κ̂3.
These relationships presume that the parameter restrictions listed following (15) hold.
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4 Estimates
Using the approach outlined in Section 3.2 I can investigate the influence of county re-
assessment lags on property tax revenues.26 The first step is to estimate a third order27
polynomial version of the non-structural equation in (14), and the results are reported in
Table 4.28 Column 1 contains the unconstrained specification while column 2 contains the
constrained specification where the reassessment lag-community characteristic interactions
have zero parameters. Using the F -statistic in the second to last row, it is possible to re-
ject the null that the constrained specification is correct even at the 99% confidence level.
This result suggests rejecting hypotheses H1–H3 from Table 3 (relative to an unrestricted
alternative) because the parameter restrictions in column 2 are a necessary condition for
those alternatives. Similarly, I reject hypothesis H4 because the Wald statistic from the
relevant restricted specification exceeds the critical value (these estimates are omitted and
computed using the technique mentioned in the next paragraph). The latter result is impor-
tant since hypothesis H4 is the restriction imposed by the variable property turnover rate
model discussed at the end of Section 2.2.
Testing hypothesis H5: Varying Single Peak, the theory proposed in this paper, is more
difficult due to the presence of inequality constraints. As a first step, column 3 presents
results when the equality constraints (from each community’s first order condition) are im-
posed.29 Using the F -statistic in the second to last row, it is not possible to reject these
restrictions at the 95th percentile. In this restricted specification the second order condition
from the theory is satisfied for 205 of the 237 communities in the sample (an 86% success
rate). To more formally investigate this point, the inequalities from the second order condi-
26Land use variables, residential and biz, are not included as regressors in any of the specifications since
they are only available going back to 1970. These factors have insignificant parameters when included in a
truncated sample regression.
27I initially considered a first degree polynomial and continued to add higher order Y terms until the most
recent addition was insignificant. As a robustness check I considered specifications which included various
combinations of terms up to order Y 5. None of the additional Y n terms were significant in the supplemental
regressions.
28The non-structural estimates imply a relationship between tax revenues and reassessment lags which is
quite similar to that found in the structural estimates. To conserve space I will only interpret the structural
parameters.
29In constructing the equality constraints discussed in footnote 21, for Zi I use the mean πt value and each
community’s θi and λi value. A similar convention is used for the inequality constraints.
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tions are imposed along with the first order conditions. The resulting quadratic programming
problem is solved using the primal active set method discussed in Fletcher [13] Chapter 10.3
and the results are reported in column 4. Of primary interest is the Wald statistic listed
in the last row which tests the imposed restrictions. It is not possible to reject at the 95th
percentile the null that the first and second order conditions both hold.30 The final restric-
tion of hypothesis H5 is that there should be no other extremum in the observed sample
period. For the restricted specification in column 4, 211 communities have an unconstrained
extremum31 exceeding their sample maximum Y and 26 have an unconstrained extremum
within sample (an 89% success rate). Unfortunately, it is possible to reject this restriction
with 95% confidence when it is imposed on the parameters (estimates omitted). However, all
of the unwanted extrema fall at the end of the sample for communities in Delaware County
which has not reassessed in over fifty years. Overall, it is difficult to reject the restrictions
imposed by hypothesis H5 relative to the completely unrestricted alternative.
With the non-structural estimates lending support to the main predictions of the theory,
it is reasonable to consider the structural approach. Table 5 presents estimates for the
government revenue specification in (15).32 These parameter estimates33 can be used to
30While Wolak [25] shows that it is infeasible to calculate the exact critical value for this test when
there are more than eight restrictions, Kodde and Palm [15] provide upper and lower bounds akin to the
bounds for the Durbin-Watson statistic. The critical lower bound is the c which solves, α = 0.5 Pr[χ2(q) ≥
c] + 0.5 Pr[χ2(q + 1) ≥ c] where each right-hand side term is a chi-squared distribution with q degrees
of freedom (the number of equality restrictions) and α significance level. The approximate solution when
α = 0.05 and q = 237 is c = 274.5, and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected if the Wald statistic is less
than c.
31Because a third order polynomial is used, there will be no more than two extrema per community and
one of them is already determined by the parameter restrictions.
32The structural estimates are consistent with four tests of the underlying theory mentioned following
(15). First, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the assessed base, the negative of market value
and the summed inflation term all have identical parameters; formally the test statistics listed below the
restricted specifications in columns two and four of Table 5 do not exceed the critical F value at the 95th
percentile. Second, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that this common parameter value exceeds
one using a one-sided t-test. Third, higher order versions of these regressors are insignificant– either singly
or jointly– when included in the specification (estimates omitted). Fourth, it is not possible to the reject
the null that the presumed assessment relationship AobsY ≡ cMAY holds (estimates omitted). In addition
I re-estimated the structural equation using the alternative functional form for the government production
function, B(S) = −α exp(−γS). I found similar revenue distortions and welfare losses as those reported
below (results omitted).
33To conserve space, I will not discuss the parameter estimates for the control variables. These parameters
have a similar sign and magnitude as those typically found in studies of local revenue or expenditure setting
behavior (see Fisher [12]). One interesting parameter to consider is the efficiency measure for the government
production function. Using the fixed effects, restricted specification in column 4 of Table 5 and the formula
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calculate a measure of the revenue distortion from county reassessment delays. The first
row of Table 6 shows the revenue per home for various reassessment lags relative to the
revenue per home in a reassessment year (calculated at sample mean values). Recall that
this ratio can be interpreted as an efficiency wedge because revenues are socially optimal in
a reassessment year. Delays of even five years, typical in virtually all states (Langhoff [17]),
increase revenues by 6%; given the small standard error, it is possible to reject the hypothesis
that this value is zero. Further revaluation delays have an accelerating affect with a 15
year delay increasing revenues by 42%.34 However, lags beyond the sample mean Y ∗ = 16
result in lower revenues because at this point the median tenure is fixed while the assessed
base continues to shrink. This means the value in the last column represents the maximal
distortion.
While the revenue distortion from county reassessment delays is large, the associated
welfare loss is quite small. The second row of Table 6 shows the mean welfare loss per home
for various reassessment lags. A five year lag imposes a loss of only $0.89 per home and the
value is not statistically different from zero. The value in the last row shows that this loss is
less than one percent of the revenue per home in a reassessment year. Even a 15 year delay
imposes a loss of only $19.74 per home or 7% of the revenue per home in a reassessment
year (the latter figure is not statistically different from zero). The reason the social loss is
so small is that reassessment delays are redistributive, benefiting infrequent movers due to
their low tax price. Because over half of the residents have not moved since the last county
reassessment (tmedian = Y ≤ Y ∗), such gains go a long way towards offsetting the losses of
recent movers.
The structural estimates can also be used to predict the timing of county reassessments.35
in footnote 25, the estimated value is γ̂ = 0.130 (an application of the delta method gives the asymptotically
valid standard error, se(γ̂) = 0.056). While it is difficult to compare this to the literature, the closeness to
zero suggests a significant degree of decreasing returns in government services.
34The reason distortions accelerate is that reassessment delays increase the median tenure at a one-for-one
rate (because tmedian = min(Y, Y ∗)) but decrease the assessed base at a slower rate (because ∂2AY /∂Y 2 > 0).
Due to this, the median will demand higher revenues at an increasing rate so long as Y ≤ Y ∗.
35The estimates to this point have presumed that county reassessments are exogenous events. However,
the endogeneity presumed here takes a simple form: a county does not reassess until some well-defined delay
is reached. Because the actual delays are quite long (see Table 1), the parameters in Tables 4 and 5 would be
largely unchanged if instead I estimated a system which includes a reassessment timing equation. Still the
results in this paragraph are not based on a full statistical framework and should be interpreted cautiously.
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A reassessment should occur when it benefits the median tenured home-owner, and Propo-
sition 3 shows this requires an assessment delay exceeding some threshold. This threshold
is uniquely determined by the median’s utility function: reassessment is beneficial after Y
years if U0(tmedian)−UY (tmedian)−C > 0 where C is the physical cost per home of reassess-
ment (in practice this cost is about $37 per home).36 This formula can be evaluated using
the utility parameters backed out of the structural estimates. The median’s net gain from
reassessment is presented in Table 7 for two of the four counties in the sample. The predicted
median break-even year is in fact quite close to the observed lag between reassessments listed
in Table 1. For example Delaware County, which last reassessed 60 years ago, has a break-
even year of 55 while Chester County, which has been reassessing roughly every 20 years,
has a break-even year of 23. The reason these counties have such disparate break-evens is
that Delaware County is much more established and so has a much older median.37 Long
reassessment delays are relatively less costly to the Delaware County median since he enjoys
a low tax price.
A final issue to consider is the revenue change when a county reassesses. The structural
estimates imply that revenues in the year prior to a reassessment are below their initial value
in each of the four counties (this calculation is omitted and uses the reassessment dates listed
in Table 1). This suggests that voters will select a tax revenue increase upon reassessment
confirming the prediction of Proposition 3.38 Bloom and Ladd [4] and Ladd [16] also find
evidence that revaluations induce higher taxes which they attribute to voter fiscal illusion.
The results here suggest another, fully rational explanation. Reassessments are associated
with tax hikes because they increase the size of the assessed base and thus the median’s
demand for taxes.39
36I estimate reassessment costs from the current experience of Delaware County. Its ongoing reassessment
will cost $7.8 million (Philadelphia Inquirer, 22 February 1996) for its 211,024 homes (1990 Census of Housing)
or $36.96 per home.
37Formally, a lower construction rate θ will imply a higher Y ∗ value which is the median tenure for the
long reassessment lags considered here.
38According to Proposition 3, when reassessment is costless the median will prefer to reassess when tax
revenues just reach their initial value. However reassessments actually entail non-trivial physical costs, and
so the median will not actually prefer reassessment until taxes have fallen below their initial value.
39One potential problem with using this theory to explain Bloom and Ladd’s observation is that it presumes
reassessment timing is endogenous. Given the lack of state enforcement and few observed revaluations in
their sample, this seems entirely plausible (the communities which they observe have an average reassessment
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5 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a model which draws a connection between community-wide re-
assessment lags and property tax revenues. Short lags result in higher tax collections since
the median voter faces a reduced tax price while longer lags decrease revenues due to the
diminished aggregate property base. Estimates based on a sample of communities in the
Philadelphia suburbs confirm the basic predictions of the theory. While reassessment lags
can significantly increase the level of revenues, they tend not to impose large social losses
because they benefit long-time residents. Still it is important to be cautious in interpreting
these results due to the presence of simplifying assumptions which can only be indirectly
tested in the sample here. Further tests using other data will help evaluate the appropriate-
ness of these assumptions.
The distortionary effect of community-wide reassessment lags has potential policy im-
plications. For example it provides another rationale, beyond the usual horizontal equity
argument, for more frequent revaluations: delays result in taxes which exceed the social
optimum. Of course one reason that revaluations are not conducted every year is that they
are costly. Given this, one practical solution would be to increase the assessed value of
unsold properties at the same rate as the region’s home price index (which the Bureau of
Labor Statistics calculates) in the intermediate years. If homes uniformly appreciate at this
rate, such a reform would completely eliminate the distortion since both tax prices and the
assessed base would reflect true market value. Unfortunately such a change is politically
infeasible since the current system actually benefits the majority (at the expense of frequent
movers), and the reform would particularly hurt long time residents, who wield dispropor-
tionate power in local politics.
This theory also has testable implications regarding popular perceptions of property
delay of 25 years, a figure which is comparable to three of the four counties in my sample). It is more difficult
to apply this argument to Ladd because the counties in her study are required to reassess every eight years.
Nonetheless, her sample likely involves higher rates of property construction and inflation than those found
in this paper, and these differences could lead the median voter to prefer a tax increase upon reassessment
(a higher construction rate lowers the maximum median age Y ∗ while higher inflation increases the rate at
which reassessment delays diminish the assessed base; these two forces work together to lower the minimum
reassessment lag at which tax collections fall below their initial level).
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taxes. Infrequent community-wide reassessments may lead fully informed voters to believe
that property taxes are too high as well as unfair. This is because in nearly all states the
median home-owner will not have moved since the last reassessment, and he will select a tax
rate which is just optimal for his property assessment but is excessive for those who have
moved since they face a higher property assessment. Hence, a random survey of residents will
find that a significant minority (the movers) consider property taxes to be too high while no
one believes taxes are too low. This explanation is testable. If an opinion survey includes an
individual’s home tenure, then it is possible to test whether recent movers disproportionately
consider property taxes to be excessive. Even without such micro-data, indirect tests are
possible if the survey includes geographic markers. The proportion of residents who find
property taxes excessive should be larger in municipalities where more time has elapsed




A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Each community’s tax rate is the optimal choice of the median aged home-owner which is
characterized by (6). When Y ≤ Y ∗(θ, λ) then tmedian = Y and (6) can be written as,
B′(RY ) =
[





(λ + θ)(1 + π)Y +1 + π(1− λ)Y +1/(1 + θ)Y
(1 + θ)(1 + π)− (1− λ)
]−1 (16)












Because B′′ < 0, the left-hand side will have the same sign as the derivative of the square
bracketed term in the numerator,




(λ + θ) ln(1 + π)(1 + π)Y +1 + π [ln(1− λ)− ln(1 + θ)] (1− λ)Y +1/(1 + θ)Y
(1 + θ)(1 + π)− (1− λ)
(18)
To show (18) is positive, it will be sufficient to prove the numerator is positive. Now the
numerator is increasing in Y so it will be sufficient to consider the case Y = 0. Some tedious
algebra shows that the resulting term,
(λ + θ) ln(1 + π)(1 + π) + π [ln(1− λ)− ln(1 + θ)] (1− λ) (19)
is strictly increasing in π so long as λ, θ > 0. This means that (19) is strictly positive when
π > 0 (since (19) equals zero when π = 0), which thus proves that (17) is strictly positive.
Now when Y > Y ∗(θ, λ) the median age is fixed at Y ∗(θ, λ). Full differentiation of the







which is strictly negative since ∂AY /∂Y < 0. This completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In the proof of Proposition 1 I showed that RY increases in Y when Y ≤ Y ∗(θ, λ). This
means in particular that RY > R0, so tax collections exceed the socially optimal level in this
interval. All that remains is to consider Y > Y ∗(θ, λ). In analogy to (16), the first order
condition may be written as,
B′(RY ) =
[





(λ + θ)(1 + π)Y
∗(θ,λ)+1 + π(1− λ)Y +1/(1 + θ)Y
(1 + θ)(1 + π)− (1− λ)
]−1 (21)
Given the social optimality condition (10), taxes are sub-optimal when the right-hand side
is greater than unity or AY (1 + π)
Y ∗(θ,λ) < 1. Since the right-hand side of (21) is increasing
in Y , a sufficient condition to complete the proof is to find some Y at which this inequality





(λ + θ)(1 + π)Y
∗(θ,λ)+1
(1 + θ)(1 + π)− (1− λ)
]−1
(22)
Now take logarithms of the right-hand side,
ln
[
(λ + θ)(1 + π)Y
∗(θ,λ)+1








− [Y ∗(θ, λ) + 1] ln(1 + π)
≈ [(1− λ)− ln 2] π
λ + θ
(23)
where I employ the definition of Y ∗(θ, λ) and two first order Taylor expansions (Taylor
expansions are valid for the purposes of signing when θ, λ and π are suitably close to zero).
So long as 1−λ > ln 2, which must hold for reasonable rates of property turnover, this value
is positive and hence the right-hand side of (21) must exceed one. This shows that for Y
large enough tax revenue will be sub-optimal. The threshold for this event is the smallest
Y value for which the right-hand side of (21) exceeds one. Due to the continuity of that
expression and the strict inequality from (23), this must occur in finite time.
Q.E.D.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Presume that a community-wide reassessment costs some amount C per home. Since a
voter’s net benefit from reassessment is decreasing in t, the age of his property (proof omit-
ted), there will be majority support for reassessing only when the median aged voter prefers
it. For Y ≤ Y ∗(θ, λ), it will be sufficient to show that assessment delays increase the me-
dian’s welfare (this implies that a reassessment will lower the median’s welfare in addition







+ ln(1 + π)
]
mY (1 + π)
−Y (24)
where I have used (2), (4), the first order condition (6), and the fact that tmedian = Y when





(λ + θ)(1 + π)





1− (λ + θ)(1 + π)







mY (1 + π)
−Y
(25)
The sign of ∂UY (tmedian)/∂Y will be identical to the sign of the square bracketed term which








(λ + θ)(1 + π) ln(1 + π) + (1− λ)π ln((1− λ)/(1 + θ))
(1 + θ)(1 + π)− (1− λ)
]
(26)
Because the right-hand side denominator is positive and (some tedious algebra shows that)
the numerator is increasing in π, it will be sufficient to consider the case π = 0. Since the
right-hand side of (26) is zero at π = 0, this means ∂UY (tmedian)/∂Y > 0 for π > 0 which
completes this part of the proof.
When Y > Y ∗(θ, λ) assume ∃Ỹ : mỸ AỸ = m0A0 (by Proposition 2, Ỹ exists and is finite
when the parameters are sufficiently near zero). Some algebra shows that mỸ (1 + π)
−Y ∗ =
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m0A0 and therefore that,
UỸ (tmedian) ≡ B(mỸ AỸ )−mỸ (1 + π)
−Y ∗ = B(m0A0)−m0A0 ≡ U0(tmedian) (27)
Some algebra shows that for Y > Y ∗(θ, λ) the median’s welfare is decreasing in Y ,
∂UY (tmedian)/∂Y < 0. Combined with (27) this means that the median (and thus a ma-
jority of voters) will strictly prefer community-wide reassessment only when Y > Ỹ so long
as reassessing is costless (C = 0). Notice from the proof of Proposition 2 that Ỹ is exactly
the year at which AY (1 + π)
Y ∗(θ,λ) = 1, so when reassessment is costless the median first
prefers reassessing when (13) is satisfied. Notice also that so long as C is not too large, there




[1] H. Aaron, “Who Pays the Property Tax? A New View,” The Brookings Institution,
Washington D.C. (1975).
[2] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, “Tax and Expenditure Limits
On Local Governments,” Washington D.C. (1995).
[3] A. Auerbach, On the design and reform of capital-gains taxation, American Economic
Review, 82, 263–267 (May 1992).
[4] H. Bloom and H. Ladd, Property tax revaluation and tax levy growth, Journal of Urban
Economics, 11, 73–84 (1982).
[5] Bureau of the Census, “Census of Population and Housing: Summary Characteristics
for Pennsylvania,” Washington D.C. (1960-1990).
[6] Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index-All Urban Con-
sumers. Area: Philadelphia-Wilmington-Trenton. Series ID: CUURA102SA0,”
http://stats.bls.gov/ (1997).
[7] Bureau of Transportation Statistics, “Census Transportation Planning Package,” De-
partment of Transportation, Washington D.C. (1980-1990).
[8] P. Dearborn, ACIR 1993 poll takes pulse on taxes, State Tax Notes, 5, 781 (1993).
[9] Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, “Employment Data,” Philadelphia
(1979, 1984, 1993).
[10] Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, “Housing Units Authorized by Build-
ing Permits,” Philadelphia (1979-1992).
[11] Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, “Land Use in the Delaware Valley,”
Philadelphia (1984, 1994).
[12] R. C. Fisher, “State and Local Public Finance,” Irwin, Chicago (1996).
[13] R. Fletcher, “Practical Methods of Optimization,” John Wiley & Sons, Chichester
(1987).
[14] R. Inman and D. Rubinfeld, The judicial pursuit of local fiscal equity, Harvard Law
Review, 192, 1662–1750 (1979).
[15] D. Kodde and F. Palm, Wald criteria for jointly testing equality and inequality con-
straints, Econometrica, 54, 1243–1248 (1986).
[16] H. Ladd, Property tax revaluation and tax levy growth revisited, Journal of Urban
Economics, 30, 83–99 (1991).
[17] G. Langhoff, “Assessment Jurisdictions and Agency Resources in the United States:
Summary of the 1986 Survey,” International Association of Assessing Officers, Chicago
(1988).
27
[18] A. O’Sullivan, T. Sexton and S. Sheffrin, “Property Taxes and Tax Revolts: The Legacy
of Proposition 13,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1995).
[19] Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs, “Citizen’s Guide to Pennsylvania Lo-
cal Government,” Bureau of Local Government Services, Harrisburg (1991).
[20] Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs, “Local Government Financial Statis-
tics,” Harrisburg (1960-1992).
[21] Pennsylvania State Tax Equalization Board, “Municipality Sales Data (unpublished),”
Harrisburg (1990-1995).
[22] T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, Bureaucrats versus voters: on the political economy of
resource allocation by direct democracy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, 563–587
(1979).
[23] K. Strumpf, Government credibility and policy choice: evidence from the pennsylvania
earned income tax, UNC Chapel Hill Economics Department Typescript (1998).
[24] K. Strumpf, A predictive index for the flypaper effect, Journal of Public Economics,
forthcoming (1998).
[25] F. Wolak, An exact test for multiple inequality and equality constraints in the linear









Table 1: Recent Reassessments in the Philadelphia Suburbs (through 1996)
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Variable (Source) Symbol Mean Std Dev Max Min
Assessment delays (PSTEB) Y 15.740 14.430 57.000 0.000
Assessment cutoff (PSTEB, DVRPC) Y ∗ 16.675 7.647 71.000 3.000
Property sale rate (PSTEB) λ 0.033 0.013 0.098 0.006
Property construction rate (DVRPC) θ 0.017 0.016 0.095 0.000
Inflation rate (BLS) π 0.050 0.030 0.130 0.008
Property tax PH (PDCA) RY 211.933 152.508 1451.107 0.000
Revenue PH (PDCA) SY 386.082 170.396 2428.570 44.346
Millage (PDCA) mY 19.413 22.777 252.400 0.000
Assessment PH [×103$] (PDCA) AY 15.261 8.383 76.554 1.810
Market value PH [×103$] (PDCA) M 76.718 43.682 406.741 8.099
Number homes [×103] (Census) homes 2.763 4.081 34.162 0.127
Median HH income [×103$] (Census) y 40.484 10.798 114.890 10.855
Population [×103] (Census) pop 8.180 11.731 95.910 0.420
% Population growth (Census) popg 1.435 2.222 13.889 -6.422
% Seniors (Census) %Senior 10.213 3.965 32.100 1.800
Housing tenure (Census) owner 3.970 2.717 25.360 0.380
Jobs PC (DVRPC, Census) jobs 0.465 0.409 4.810 0.000
% commute to Philadelphia (Census) %Phil 11.576 13.047 69.160 0.000
% commute out of state (Census) %OutState 8.122 11.186 72.372 0.000
% pay EIT at work (Census) %PayEIT 27.162 28.183 96.778 0.000
Overhead index (PDCA) overhead index -0.000 0.470 1.610 -2.465
% Business Property (DVRPC) biz 30.953 19.165 81.200 0.000
% Residential Property (DVRPC) residential 26.280 17.763 92.300 0.600
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Notes:
Sample: 1960-1992, 237 Philadelphia SMSA municipalities. ‘PH’ = per home, ‘HH’ = household,
‘PC’ = per capita. All money denominated terms are normalized to 1992 values using the
Philadelphia general CPI (the choice of base year does not influence the theoretical model).
Sources:
BLS = Bureau of Labor Statistics [6]
Census = Department of Census [5], [7]
DVRPC = Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission [9], [10], [11]
PDCA = Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs [20]
PSTEB = Pennsylvania State Tax Equalization Board [21]
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Hypothesis Parameter Restrictions
H1: Independence ∂RY (Y )
∂Y






= constant ∀Y ωn = 0 ∀n > 0, ρin = 0 ∀n > 1
H3: Common Single Extremum ∂RY (Y =Ŷ )
∂Y
= 0 ωn = 0 ∀n > 0, Yi(ρi, ω) = Ŷ ∀i





> 0 ∀Y ρin + Ziωn ≥ 0 ∀i, n > 0
H5: Varying Single Peak ∂RY (Y )
∂Y
R 0 ↔ Y R Y ∗i Yi(ρi, ω)sample = Yi(ρi, ω)sample = Y ∗i
Table 3: Leading Hypotheses and Their Restrictions on (14)
Notes:
For H3 and H5: Yi(ρi, ω) ≡ {Yi: ∂RY /∂Y = 0}. For H5: “sample” indicates a domain restricted to
the observed sample; Yi(ρi, ω) ≡ {Yi: ∂RY /∂Y = 0, ∂2RY /∂Y 2 < 0}; Y ∗i is defined in (8).
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Dependent variable: RY
(H1–H3) (H5 FOC) (H5 FOC, SOC)
Regressors Unconstrained Constrained I Constrained II Constrained III
constant -35.826 96.607 -47.451 -50.488
(30.963) (38.885) (33.441) (23.254)
πt -413.790 -675.529 -107.856 -190.568
(602.967) (670.238) (585.864) (509.235)
λi -856.352 -1639.570 -743.879 -799.865
(306.139) (396.522) (330.567) (287.012)
θi 1015.528 942.525 1309.578 1397.800
(267.876) (342.619) (304.233) (290.456)
Y 8.022 12.088 8.746 8.811
(2.425) (3.410) (2.633) (2.308)
Y × πt 7.181 — 6.999 6.879
(27.528) (21.832) (20.074)
Y × λi 11.105 — 11.003 11.009
(57.313) (55.124) (53.127)
Y × θi 209.475 — 185.741 189.324
(49.418) (47.578) (39.897)
Y 2 -0.540 -0.634 -0.479 -0.501
(0.120) (0.160) (0.137) (0.111)
Y 2 × πt -0.177 — -0.205 -0.287
(1.486) (1.388) (1.323)
Y 2 × λi -3.026 — -2.742 -2.799
(2.953) (2.847) (2.711)
Y 2 × θi -2.782 — -4.117 -3.948
(2.558) (2.755) (2.323)
Y 3 8.013× 10−3 8.867× 10−3 8.144× 10−3 8.193× 10−3
(1.61× 10−3) (2.09× 10−3) (1.53× 10−3) (1.37× 10−3)
Y 3 × πt -0.017 — -0.010 -0.012
(0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
Y 3 × λi 0.023 — 0.029 0.045
(0.040) (0.042) (0.034)
Y 3 × θi 0.024 — 0.028 0.023
(0.034) (0.040) (0.49)
N 7486 7486 7486 7486
R2 0.700 0.677 0.691 —
F -statistic — 55.21 0.82 —
Wald statistic — — — 211.4
Table 4: Non-Structural Estimates: Equation (14)
Notes:
(standard errors). Sample: 1960-1992, 237 Philadelphia SMSA municipalities. The Unconstrained and Constrained I-II
specifications are estimated using OLS (the results are similar when seemingly unrelated regressions are used); the
Constrained III specification is estimated using the primal active set method discussed in Fletcher [13] Chapter 10.3. The
constant and non-interacted Y n terms have community-specific parameters; the table presents the average value. Constrained
I imposes a zero parameter on the reassessment lag - community characteristic interactions; Constrained II imposes on the
parameters the first order condition (FOC) for each community at Y = Y ∗i ; Constrained III imposes on the parameters the
first and second order conditions (SOC) at Y = Y ∗i . The F and Wald statistics are used to test these restrictions (see text):
the 95% critical values are 1.88 (for Constrained I), 1.00 (for Constrained II), and 274.5 (for Constrained III). Additional
regressors included in all specifications: M , y, pop, popg, %Senior, owner, jobs, %Phil, %OutState, %PayEIT ,
overhead index, overhead index× EIT , overhead index×HighwayAid and period dummies.
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Dependent variable: ln(SY )
(OLS) (OLS) (FE) (FE)
Regressors Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
constant 2.742 3.124 — —
(0.235) (0.250)
ln(AobsY ) 1.194 — 1.103 —
(0.084) (0.074)
ln(M) -1.149 — -1.184 —
(0.099) (0.098)∑tmedian
s=1 ln(1 + πs) 1.184 — 1.177 —
(0.082) (0.066)
ln(AobsY ) − ln(M) +
∑tmedian
s=1 ln(1 + πs) — 1.157 — 1.149
(0.077) (0.074)
ln(y) 0.382 0.303 0.346 0.306
(0.023) (0.033) (0.026) (0.025)
ln(pop) 0.114 0.080 0.056 0.051
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014)
popg -0.024 -0.025 -0.013 -0.015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
%Senior 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(owner) 0.028 0.025 0.013 0.043
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
ln(jobs) 0.057 0.164 0.054 0.044
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
%Phil 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
%OutState -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
%PayEIT 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
overhead index 0.041 0.048 0.040 0.036
(0.015) (0.017) (0.006) (0.007)
I(city) 0.528 0.340 — —
(0.040) (0.045)
I(borough) 0.245 0.279 — —
(0.010) (0.011)
Municipality Fixed Effect? No No Yes Yes
Period Fixed Effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7486 7486 7486 7486
R2 0.799 0.761 0.844 0.817
F -statistic — 1.794 — 1.941
Table 5: Structural Estimates: Equation (15)
Notes:
(standard errors). Sample: 1960-1992, 237 Philadelphia SMSA municipalities. FE = Municipality fixed effects regression. Key
regressors are in bold. Mean of dependent variable = 5.875. F -statistic is for testing H0: restricted specification in columns 2
and 4; the 95% critical values are F (2, 7438) ≈ F (2, 7204) = 3.00.
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Statistic Y = 5 Y = 10 Y = 15
ŜY /Ŝ0 1.060 1.195 1.419
(0.024) (0.051) (0.086)
∆ŴY $0.886 $5.561 $19.744
(1.292) (1.750) (4.236)
100×∆ŴY /Ŝ0 0.320 2.008 7.130
(3.026) (4.087) (9.813)
Table 6: Reassessment Lags: Revenue Distortion and Welfare Loss Per Home
Notes:
Numbers in parentheses are asymptotically valid standard errors calculated using the delta method. Values
are based on parameter estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 and mean community characteristics. The
formulae for ŜY /Ŝ0 and ∆ŴY are given in Section 3.2. Ŝ0 = 276.9 is calculated from (15).
Chester County Y = 15 Y = 20 Y = 25
U0(tmedian)− UY (tmedian) -$66.76 $15.84 $58.13
C $36.96 $36.96 $36.96
Net Benefit $-103.72 -$21.12 $21.17
Delaware County Y = 45 Y = 50 Y = 55
U0(tmedian)− UY (tmedian) $19.34 $30.79 $37.25
C $36.96 $36.96 $36.96
Net Benefit -$17.62 -$6.17 $0.29
Table 7: The Median’s Net Benefit from Reassessment
Notes:
See text for a discussion of how these figures are calculated. For each county, the mean θ, λ and AY values
of the component municipalities are used to estimate SY and mY from the structural estimates. There is
no county-specific πs, so the geometric mean of the SMSA measure is used for each county. No standard
errors are calculated because there is no variance measure for C (see footnote 36).
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